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Recap; Tyrrell & Nelson v. BNSF: Jumping the Tracks Between
FELA, Daimler, and Consent
Marin Keyes
No. DA 14-0825 Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 9, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana.
For purposes of oral argument, the Court stated BNSF would be the
appellee and Tyrrell & Nelson the appellants. This is a change from the
designations used in the appellate briefs and despite a motion made by
BNSF.1
I. CHRISTOPHER MORELAND FOR APPELLANTS
Mr. Moreland started his opening argument by repeating a key
fact: Tyrrell and Nelson brought their claims under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). Mr. Moreland did not advance too far
in his argument before the justices launched into a thorough examination
of § 56 of FELA.2 The justices began by asking Mr. Moreland to address
BNSF’s argument that § 56 is a venue statute conferring only concurrent
subject matter jurisdiction to states. Mr. Moreland opined there is a
fundamental disconnect in a statute conferring both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction to federal courts but conferring only subject matter
jurisdiction to state courts. He went on to say § 56 is a venue statute, but
jurisdiction is assumed in a location where venue is proper. In a point
Mr. Moreland made several times, no one is disputing this case could
have been filed in Montana federal court, thus it is a situation akin to one
where forum non conveniens is used. In other courts, forums non
conveniens is available when jurisdiction and venue are present in a
court, but a different forum is more appropriate for the disposition of the
case.
Mr. Moreland espoused the view that BNSF would be subject to
general personal jurisdiction even if § 56 did not apply. At various times
in his argument and rebuttal Mr. Moreland referenced BNSF’s
substantial and expanding business activities in Montana. The Court
Mot. to Consolidate and Set Briefing Schedule, 4, Mar. 3, 2015, DA 14-0825.
45 U.S.C. § 56 (2012) (stating “[u]nder this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the
courts of the several States.”).
1
2
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questioned how Mr. Moreland distinguished this case from Martinez v.
Aero Caribbean,3 a Ninth Circuit case where general personal
jurisdiction was not to exercised over a corporation conducting
substantial business in the jurisdiction. Mr. Moreland replied BNSF is
essentially a monopoly in Montana, dominating the competition posed by
Montana Rail Link, a domestic railroad business.
Branching off of this discussion, Mr. Moreland shifted to his
consent argument. Immediately, the justices brought up the fact that
consent was not raised as an issue below. Mr. Moreland admitted it was
not explicitly argued, but consent is one of the bases for jurisdiction, and
the general facts supporting consent were in the district court arguments.
Counsel continued his argument, citing Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan
Inc.,4 a New Jersey case where a court found consent through the
company’s business registration. Next, Mr. Moreland was asked how
Montana’s registered agent statute fit into the consent argument.5 Mr.
Moreland responded it was not just a registered agent that provided
consent, but the service agent in conjunction with other actions a
corporation takes when it wants to be a registered business in Montana.
II. RANDY COX FOR APPELLEE
Though Mr. Cox began his argument with the applicability of
Daimler AG v. Bauman,6 where the U.S. Supreme Court held
corporations are typically only subject to general personal jurisdiction in
the state of incorporation and the principal place of business, the Court
quickly moved to preliminary questions. First the Court sought to clarify
BNSF’s beliefs about specific personal jurisdiction. Mr. Cox assured the
Court cases could still be brought in any state in which injury occurred.
Next, Justice Shea posed a hypothetical involving a worker employed in
Montana but injured in Idaho. Mr. Cox affirmed in such a situation the
worker would not be able to bring suit in Montana state court under
BNSF’s interpretation of specific jurisdiction, unless he or she could
prove a part of the railroad’s negligence occurred in Montana. The Court
wondered how BNSF can be prejudiced by defending a case in Montana,
where BNSF has thousands of miles of railroad track, yet not prejudiced
in Delaware, it’s state of incorporation, which has zero miles of track.
Mr. Cox used this question to transition back to Daimler. Mr. Cox
declared the nationwide applicability of Daimler in all cases, and the
U.S. Supreme Court’s intention to do so.
3
4

Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014).
Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., No. 14-4508, 2015 WL 1305764 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2015)

MONT. CODE ANN. § 35–7–115(1) (2015) (stating “[t]he appointment or maintenance in this state
of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented
entity in this state.”).
6
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014).
5
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Despite Mr. Cox’s turn to the applicability of Daimler, the Court
seemed more eager to analyze the interaction between FELA and
Daimler. Mr. Cox denied § 56’s ability to compel a state to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. He proclaimed it would be
unconstitutional to extend personal jurisdiction so far and cited cases
where the state court at issue refused to do so. Using this as a cue, the
justices initiated a barrage of questions concerning Miles v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co.,7 a case where a Missouri state court had been forced to take a
FELA case. Mr. Cox distinguished Miles as a case concerning subject
matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. Ultimately, Mr. Cox
argued, even though Miles is factually alike the case here, it was decided
before Daimler and is no longer good precedent.
In his remaining time, Mr. Cox expressed a wish to discuss the
consent argument. Mr. Cox informed the Court the registration form to
conduct business in Montana is one page. He expressed doubt that
signing a paper and registering an agent was enough to grant personal
jurisdiction over a business. Mr. Moreland’s cases finding consent could
not be used in Montana, Mr. Cox argued, because other states do not
have the same statutes as Montana. Further on, he cited Ninth Circuit
cases where consent jurisdiction had not been upheld over a registered
corporation.
III. MR. MORELAND’S REBUTTAL
The Court directed Mr. Moreland to begin his rebuttal with
another look at the consent argument. Mr. Moreland bolstered the cases
he cited earlier, while discounting the Ninth Circuit cases BNSF cited by
saying one of the cases, N. Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp,8 was decided when
a different statute was in effect. Mr. Moreland reiterated that consent is
an independent basis for personal jurisdiction, and even without § 56,
BNSF is subject to personal jurisdiction since it conducts business in
Montana.
Mr. Moreland also rehashed his argument that if § 56 confers
personal jurisdiction to federal courts, it must be understood to confer the
same jurisdiction to state courts. By arguing otherwise BNSF is
mounting a constitutionality challenge to § 56; both sides, plus the
justices, agree Congress had the ability to enact FELA under the
commerce power.
At the end of rebuttal, the Court returned to Daimler, referencing
the comment that a lack of logic exists if a corporation is “at home” in
every state in which it does business.9 Mr. Moreland responded it is not
an overextension by hitting on two of his main points: Daimler is a non7
8
9

Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1948).

N. Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1942).
Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761.
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FELA case; and BNSF has been subject to personal jurisdiction in
Montana for the past one hundred years, hence there cannot be an
extension if the jurisdiction was exercised historically.
IV. PREDICTIONS
Two critical queries likely must be resolved before the Court
reaches the practical issues in the case. First, the Court will likely decide
how FELA impacts a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. Second,
the Court will likely determine the scope of applicability for Daimler’s
test regarding general personal jurisdiction. The Court will likely reserve
a discussion of consent and whether BNSF is subject to general personal
jurisdiction in Montana until after these two questions have been settled.
The discussion concerning FELA will likely be the primary issue
because it potentially may change or render moot the Daimler
discussion. The Court faces a new issue here, because as both sides
admitted, there does not seem to be any case dealing with the interaction
of FELA and Daimler. Moreover, the Court appeared neutral in its
consideration of the breadth and intent of § 56. The Court asked both
sides multiple questions about § 56 which highlighted each position’s
weak points. However, since the justices spent a large amount of time
questioning both sides about other issues, it seems unlikely the Court will
find the FELA argument dispositive.
During Mr. Cox’s argument the justices seemed unconvinced
that Daimler created a bright line rule. Daimler, which involved a
defendant international corporation, is factually distinguishable from the
defendant corporation here, but the justices did make sure to note the
definition of a foreign corporation includes not only international
corporations, but sister state corporations as well. There may be a divide
in the justices regarding Daimler and its effects on Montana. Mr. Cox’s
answer to the hypothetical presented during his argument seemed to
disappoint Justice Shea, as Mr. Cox’s answer means a Montana worker
cannot bring suit in Montana if he was not injured here. Nevertheless,
another justice countered an argument put forth by Mr. Moreland by
stating there is a continuing availability of state and federal forums, even
if the Montana forum is lost in these types of cases.
Though Tyrrell & Nelson did not raise the consent argument
below, it seems likely the Court will address it in its decision. The
justices were amendable to hearing consent arguments from both sides,
and they even asked Mr. Moreland to address it in his rebuttal.
Interestingly, the Court did not ask any questions about consent, except
for one concerning Montana’s registered agent statute. This may signal
the justices’ belief that consent does not grant jurisdiction in this
particular case.
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Lastly, the Court must decide whether BNSF is subject to
general personal jurisdiction in Montana. When looking at BNSF’s
business activities, the Court may compare BNSF’s activities in Montana
to those nationwide or to domestic Montana businesses, such as Montana
Rail Link. The Court will likely compare BNSF to domestic businesses,
as Mr. Moreland argued for this comparison, and Mr. Cox failed to
reintroduce the Daimler concept of looking at nationwide business
activities. Still, the Court did bring up the Martinez case decided by the
Ninth Circuit, where substantial business was not enough for personal
jurisdiction. The Court may ultimately be more swayed by the Ninth
Circuit precedent than by other arguments presented by counsel.

